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THE FUTURE NAVY - MARITIME CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT OPERATIONS

(DNS  PRESENTATION TO GREEK XX)

NOV 05

Introduction

[SLIDE - INTRO] Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning.  I am Commodore Tom Cunningham and I am the Director of The Naval Staff Division.  My aim today is to provide a strategic context to the day's discussions by describing how the RN distils higher level policy to identify how we will operate in the future particularly in the Joint environment.  As personal background I have Commanded 2 Warships including the RN's last steam powered surface ship HMS FEARLESS and more recently I was the Integrated Project Team Leader for the Future Surface Combatant. 

Context

[SLIDE - ORGANISATION]  Let me take a few minutes and explain where my Department sits within the Ministry of Defence and how it links in with the overall delivery of Defence Capability.  As you can see from the slide, The Naval Staff is one of three single service staffs each headed by a four star with linkages through policy and budgets committees to Chief of Defence Staff currently an Army four star. The MOD is responsible for the defence of the UK and Overseas Territories , our people and interests.  It is both a Department of State - formulating Defence Policy and providing advice and support to Ministers and. the HQ of the Armed Forces - providing military advice to the Government and Direction of Operations.  The chain of Command from ministers to single service Chiefs is clear and transparent, even more so now that we all work in the same building, the three service Chiefs are all located on one side of the newly refurbished Ministry of Defence in London and the Secretary of State also has his office and staff on the same floor.  In all some 3000 staff work within the Ministry.

The Naval Staff are responsible for both the writing of high level maritime concepts and for the shaping and influencing of central policy and strategy.    

Like many organisations the RN faces continuous evolution and our four star Front Line Command and the three star Command responsible for personnel issues (CINCFLEET and 2SL on the slide) will amalgamate to form a single Budgetary authority in the early part of next year.

You will see that the Naval Staff works directly to a two star Assistant Chief; there are four sub divisions: Strategy, Deterrence, Partnerships and Secretariat.  I am mainly going to concentrate on the area delivered by Strategy but the other areas are equally important.  Briefly Deterrence is responsible for policy issues stemming from the UK 's independent nuclear deterrent, delivered by the Royal Navy's four SSBNs.  Partnerships are responsible for our interaction with NATO and other allies through staff talks and joint ventures while Secretariat provides a briefing and staffing process to CNS and ACNS and Ministers.

[SLIDE - PLANNING PROCESS]  This slide shows the planning process and the hierarchy of Future Navy publications and their linkages - more of which in a minute.

The Defence vision describes the manner in which the UK Armed Forces should operate in the 2020 timescale.  Defence Vision incorporates the Jt Higher Level Operational Concept which in turn provides a head mark for UK operations by describing the conceptual component of fighting power through the Defence Capability Framework.

The Strategic Defence Review of 1998 emphasised the importance of expeditionary operations and generated, for the RN, the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations.  This was a fundamental shift of emphasis from a sea-control Navy of the Cold War to one that could contribute to the Joint battlespace and, in particular, influence events ashore from the sea.  Further policy directives that followed the events of 9/11 further reinforced the expeditionary requirement and the Defence Strategic Guidance of 2005 described future UK forces that are:

·        Optimised for Jointness and capable of coalition Ops

·        Structured for expeditionary operations (major change for the RN, but probably most challenging for Army and Air Force)

·        Balanced and capable

·        While remaining focused on delivering relevant effect at each level of warfare

[SLIDE - BLANK]  The Royal Navy, along with the rest of UK Defence, has been through significant change since the end of the Cold War.  CNS has been very clear on the challenges we face and regularly speaks of "unprecedented change across defence and both inside and outside traditional alliances."  He is determined that the UK must build on the traditional strength of Maritime Power and sees versatility as the key.  The Royal Navy is a powerful blend of equipment and people able to alternate between roles, from disaster relief, through peacekeeping, to high intensity warfighting.  As the demands on the Royal Navy change and the pressure on resources increases, we must also look to enhancing the maritime contribution to effects-based operations by procuring the right capabilities in our future platforms through a proper understanding of how the Navy's role needs to develop in a wider defence context.  There is, of course, a challenging dynamic between Policy, Resources and Commitments that absorbs considerable effort in the MOD.  The simple truth is that (1)policy dictates our force structures; (2)commitments exceed our policy assumptions; (3)and our resourcing is insufficient for either.     

So in light of the policy guidelines mentioned earlier and real world influences, how do we go about planning for the future?  The answer is in simple logical steps.  Drawing from the high level strategic direction we start with having a Vision of where we want to be, we then describe how we'll operate when we get there, and we then come up with a plan to make sure that the Vision and the operating idea are actively reviewed, adjusted and ultimately realised.  [SLIDE - SELF BUILD FN, FMOC, NSP] Consequently we have 1SL's Future Navy Vision, the Future Maritime Operational Concept and the Naval Strategic Plan.

Let's now move on and look at the 3 Future Navy documents, starting with Future Navy.

Future Navy

[SLIDE - FUTURE NAVY]

We have used the Policy set out in the Defence White Paper of 2003 as our authoritative reference and the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations as the broad conceptual base to describe in Future Navy (or FN) a focus on littoral warfare and force projection ashore.  CNS' Vision for the future is that of a Versatile Maritime Force, characterised by agility, which will: [SLIDE - FN CONCEPT]:

·         Be optimised for mission success across the MTs.

·         Provide task configured maritime capabilities to contribute to the differing scales of effort defined in policy guidance.

·         Deliver global reach and presence with afloat and shore-based sustainability, generating persistence to operate in a decisive manner or make a significant contribution to campaign success.

·         Conduct contingent Joint operations overseas, gain assured access to the theatre of operations for the maritime-based Joint Force, enable or deliver rapid Joint effect, and achieve or contribute to decision superiority.

·         Make a significant and decisive contribution to the maritime security of the UK home base, support Other Government Departments and protect the maritime expeditionary capability.

·         Be fully interoperable with the Future Army, Future Air Force, and other potential national and international military and civil partners in future Joint or Coalition operations.

·         Change efficiently and cost effectively between differing levels of readiness and capability as required by the strategic situation.

·         Be agile and capable of exploiting advances in technology to achieve mission success more effectively and efficiently.

·         and finally have as its hallmark high quality leadership, teamwork, and professionalism, together with agility of mind, systems and organisation, coupled with the will to succeed. [SLIDE - BLANK]

FMOC

Having established Future Navy as the headmark, the Navy Board has described an operational concept stating how we will fight in the Joint and multi-national battlespace of the 2015 period.  [hold up FMOC]  This [SLIDE - FMOC] was endorsed centrally by our Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board, chaired by VCDS.  This Joint endorsement was essential because the provenance of FMOC lies at the heart of Defence and relates to the Army, Royal Air Force, Special Forces, logistics and other key enablers, all of whom are stakeholders in the Versatile Maritime Force.  FMOC reflects the manoeuvrist approach to operations which is being further strengthened by the Effects Based approach to warfighting.  In particular, building on our well proven kinetic capability, we will focus increasingly on the power of cognitive effects to undermine and influence the cohesion of potential adversaries.    An example of this cognitive effect might be the effect of positioning a CVF TG on the mind of a potential adversary.

The increasing emphasis on effects and the prominent place of NEC are only 2 of the broad range of themes contained in the FMOC. 

[SLIDE - 5 CMR] FMOC describes 5 Core Maritime Roles (or CMRs).  [SLIDE- LIT M]

Maritime Force Projection, the first CMR, is the spearhead of what the future Navy brings to defence, it has two components.  Littoral Manoeuvre will place seabased, Joint amphibious forces in a position to threaten, or apply force ashore.  The seaborne assault force will be an integrated, Joint, task force capable of independent rapid deployment and combat by simultaneous over the horizon air and surface assault.  It will have the ability, within the Joint campaign, to conduct and integrate with land operations, ensuring that the littoral flank remains an enemy vulnerability and indeed it may encompass all or part of the air manoeuvre forces available. Additionally the amphibious force can constitute entirely the Land contribution to operations up to the medium scale - thus providing both the Theatre Entry capability and the subsequent Land manoeuvre Brigade. 

Maritime Strike [SLIDE- MAR S] is the capability to interdict the land using direct and indirect fire, tactical airpower, attack helicopters and information operations.  We will look to emerging technology to increase the range, volume, precision, sustainability and responsiveness of this capability.  Initial access, basing and overflight problems can be avoided by the use of carrier-borne air.  The RN's new carriers, JCA and MASC form a crucial part of this capability.

[SLIDE- TE]  The VMF will shape the maritime manoeuvre space through Theatre Entry, enabling Maritime Force Projection and access for the Joint Force.  Sea Control will normally be required as it will allow freedom of manoeuvre for Maritime Strike assets.   It will facilitate Littoral Manoeuvre and allow protection of the Joint force both embarked and afloat.  Theatre Entry allows the Joint Commander to deploy and consolidate his forces at a time and place of his choosing and includes maritime force protection, which will be achieved through distribution and dispersal, signature control, co-operative deception and mobility.  We will also make ourselves harder to neutralise if we are hit, by using novel, composite materials and collective protection.

Flexible Global Reach [SLIDE- FGR] is a product of maritime reach, readiness and sustainability.  It exploits freedom of the seas, large lift capacity, endurance and ability to poise thus giving politico-military flexibility.  These advantages allow maritime based forces to be forward deployed at high readiness without intrusive basing - of growing importance with the increasing priority on rapid intervention.  Flexible Global Reach helps to prevent or deter piracy, terrorism and smuggling and allows interdiction and blockade.  It clearly also underpins a diverse range of other roles including hydrography, strategic intelligence gathering and nuclear deterrent patrols. 

[SLIDE- MAR SY] Recognising that UK Maritime Security starts a long way from the home base, this CMR nonetheless focuses on activities in and around UK home waters.  Home Office led, it is crucially based on co-operation with and support to Other Government Departments.  It also acknowledges the importance of the maritime sector to UK interests, as the nation has found influence and protection through a well resourced Maritime Force and, indeed, this is likely to continue into the future.

Finally the 5th CMR - Networked C4ISR [SLIDE- C4ISR] - recognises that future platforms must be able to make a telling contribution to decision superiority over the future adversary with the optimum mix of ISR assets.  In turn they must be able to integrate within a fused, accurate and shared real time picture of the Joint battlespace.  This improved Shared Situational Awareness will be a key component of more effective Mission Command.  Future platforms such as T45 will also constitute an excellent environment from which to exercise command and control of Joint operations and this will be especially the case in the expeditionary context, and even more so early in any operation, when levels of host nation support are at their most uncertain.

NSP  

[SLIDE- NSP]  The challenge for the Naval Staff lies in ensuring that the iterative Future Navy process remains relevant, incorporates emerging departmental policy and guidance and is constructed to absorb strategic shocks.  [SLIDE - LOD]  We are in the process of refreshing the NSP, moving from six pillars to eight Lines of Development which are the agreed structure through which the single services should deliver military capability.  What is crucial is the finessing of the complex relationship between all of them as it is that which generates and sustains an effective and balanced military capability within the resources available. 

What I want to do now is to briefly talk about how the Royal Navy contributes to the delivery of Joint Effect.  There are a number of examples that I could use but I would like to expand on the Concept of Joint Sea Basing.

[SLIDE DEFINITION] This is the Joint Warfare definition.

[SLIDE PP] Today's and tomorrow's environments are very different, requiring agile, rapidly deployable forces that are capable of sustained reach and persistence.   Our aspiration is to project power from a fully networked sea base where the force will be a joint force and will be tailored according to the mission and strategic objectives.  It will benefit from the protection conferred through the control of the maritime flank and will provide the Joint Commander with a viable alternative to traditional methods of delivering combat power. 

[SLIDE POTENTIAL AREAS OF USE] It will allow the sea to be used as a manoeuvre space, enhance strategic, operational and tactical manoeuvre, create and sustain tempo through manoeuvre and enable rapid deployment of forces.  Sea Basing should contribute to the sustainment and persistence of forces in areas where Host Nation Support is limited or not available.  It should also deliver plug and play medical facilities through the employment of assets such as the Joint Casualty Treatment Ship in the future. 

Sea basing will also contribute to the maintenance and repair of Land, Air and Sea platforms through the provision of Combat Service Support and Operational Maintenance and Repair.  All with organic force protection.

[ SLIDE SEA BASING VISION] Sea basing provides Commanders with assured support through Projection, Protection and Sustainment of a Joint Force.  The objective is to provide a fully integrated, network enabled force, built around a Carrier Strike Group able to deliver organic theatre entry using forces such as 3 Cdo Bde or a similar Land force.  The intention is to be able to project a force into the littoral and beyond, under the protection of maritime platforms. 

The United Kingdom is a long way off the US model of Expeditionary Strike Groups networked with Maritime Pre-positioning Force and using Theatre Support Vessels to move combat elements from Advanced Bases to the Sea Base. 

A central tenet of the concept is to reduce the dependency on Host Nation Support, where that is appropriate.  The sea basing concept incorporates all of the components of capability including Fires, C4ISR, SF and Logistics.  The maritime component already contributes in many ways, particularly in Joint Force sustainment.. but there is a long way to go.

[SLIDE ALBION QUOTE]  Exercises and experimentation such as the recent embarkation of the Joint Force Head Quarters in HMS ALBION demonstrate our commitment to the concept.

[SLIDE OPERATIONS] It is not a new idea and this slide shows a few operations where it has been employed, deliberately or by implication.

[SLIDE FALKLANDS ] I accept of course that our operations in the Falkland Islands in 1982 were wholly supported from afloat, but strictly speaking were not sea based, depending as they did on the establishment of a substantial shore based support area in San Carlos water.

[SLIDE FY] The advantages of using Afloat support shipping to support land component operations were re-discovered almost by accident in the Balkans in the late 1990s.  Extended lines of communication from SPLIT through the mountains and into the centre of Bosnia , lack of secure storage, and a predominantly sea line of communication led to the positioning of RFA Fort George alongside in Split .

She remained there for a little over 2 years, departing in 2000.  She provided nothing than more hotel services, and secure storage, particularly for reserves of ammunition, but relieved the land component of the burden, particularly for surge operational contingency stocks.  She also provided maintenance support for the amphibious support helicopters when based in Split .

[SLIDE SL] The deployment of the UK amphibious group in 2000 was the first occasion where the size and shape of the logistic support tail of the embarked force were consciously tailored around embarked stocks.  Amphibious groups had always deployed with War Maintenance Reserve stocks embarked, but the constitution of these stocks was a product of some arcane formula derived post war, and rarely if ever modified.

Thought and planning applied to the embarked stocks, a brief shopping trip in Gibraltar on the way out of the Med, allowed the ARG to support the early entry forces with combat supplies, and field artillery, and subsequently to establish the basic infrastructure for the Short Term Training Team. 

[SLIDE OMAN ]  Lessons learned in Sierra Leone were carried forward into the amphibious deployment in 2001 to OMAN , where the plan was to support the 3 Cdo Brigade entirely from the sea along a 120km land Line of Communication for the period of the exercise. 

[SLIDE AFGHANISTAN ]  Operations in Afghanistan followed.  A significant slice of the force of 1700 men, 100 vehicles and 5 CH47 was deployed direct from the Indian ocean , or via theatre airheads.  This reduced loading on the strategic coupling bridge.

A sizeable portion of the ammunition, most of the engines, main assemblies spares and other stores, were kept on a mix of charter and afloat shipping in the Gulf of Oman .  These stores were called forward on demand from the Forward Operating Base at BAGRAM airfield, throughout the deployment. 

[SLIDE AL FAW]  Many of you will be familiar with operations in 2003 where the Theatre Entry forces were projected and sustained from the Sea Base on the Al Faw peninsula.  Inclement weather conditions restricted flight operations to US Navy and Marine Corps TACAIR and the US and Royal Marine elements gained a tactical advantage coming from the sea.

[SLIDE MAIN OBSERVATIONS]  So, we can see that Joint Sea Basing is not a new idea but it offers flexibility across the different levels of Command and throughout the phases of an operation.  It employs a dynamic and scaleable construct, increasingly networked within the Joint Force. For example, the UK 's amphibious capability is currently undergoing a Bowmanisation programme that will deliver a considerably enhanced networked capability. 

The construct will form part of the Joint Commander's estimate and now appears in Doctrine publications such as the Army's Land operations. 

[SLIDE - SWOT] But like all ideas there are drawbacks.  Mostly self evident but we are some way from delivering the desired levels of assured support.  Indirect Fires and bandwidth are issues as is the ability to conduct high tempo operations with our current ship to objective manoeuvre assets.  But on a positive side, sea based elements enjoy high levels of force protection and have the ability to exploit the maritime flank as a manoeuvre space.  CVF and Carrier Strike will give us the ability to project power from the littoral through employment of the Joint Combat Aircraft in tandem with increased surveillance and intelligence functions possibly using UAVs deployed from maritime platforms.  We don't want to scare the horses and I must stress that sea basing should be viewed as one option within a range of alternative schemes of manoeuvre open to the Joint Commander

[SLIDE QUICK WINS] So where are we now?  The Analytical Concept has been endorsed and implementation is now the responsibility of the Director of Joint Capabilities.  It is fair to say that logistics and sustainment do generally spring to mind when talking about Joint Sea Basing and that is where the majority of quick wins lie.  A recent meeting of the working group highlighted progress made in those areas but there will also be some experimentation as part of the Joint Campaign Development process.

As well as making sure that the Joint Sea Basing concept is represented in future warfare publications, it will form part of the standard military estimate process.  Its inclusion in the European Amphibious Initiative is being pursued in London by the Ministry of Defence and it will be raised as a topic at planned NATO logistics meeting.  Joint Maritime Operational Training will also include elements of sea basing in future exercises and PJHQ will be invited to consider sea basing in the Livex in 2008.

[SLIDE - T45]  Versatility built into new platforms - T45 with bespoke accommodation for RM or SF.

[SLIDE FRAME OF MIND]  JSB is a frame of mind rather than a procurement hungry concept.  But it will gather momentum, particularly as the UK remains committed to developing agile flexible forces that are capable of rapid deployment

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can predict that the navy of the future will operate in an unpredictable strategic environment in which it will face global, multifaceted symmetric and asymmetric threats.  From this presentation I hope you now understand how the Navy Boards Vision will be used to create a Versatile Maritime Force which will deliver a balanced and rapidly deployable Joint expeditionary warfighting capability.  It should also be apparent how the projection of air power from the sea is so vital particularly to the first 3 Core Maritime Roles in providing Joint expeditionary fighting power to achieve decisive effect on and from the sea.

 [SLIDES - CONSTITUTION]  Having stressed that sea basing is more than logistics can I leave you with this historical example.

[SLIDE - QUESTIONS] I would now be delighted to take any questions that you may have.